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QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether Illinois may require personal
assistants working under the auspices of the State’s
Rehabilitation Program to pay their share of the
representation costs incurred by a union selected on
a majority basis by the personal assistants
themselves to serve as their exclusive bargaining
representative?
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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1
Amici curiae are the law professors and scholars
listed in Appendix A. Amici teach, research, and
write about labor relations and labor law, and have
expertise in the issues before the Court in this case.
The interests of Amici are to maintain the integrity
of the law regarding the application of the First
Amendment to the public sector workforce, and to
aid the Court by contextualizing the important role
of labor unions in the public sector.
A list of signatories can be found in Appendix A.
Institutional
affiliations
are
provided
for
identification purposes only.

No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part,
and no counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended
to fund the preparation of this brief. No person other than the
Amici Curiae or their counsel made a monetary contribution to
the preparation or submission of this brief. Letters evidencing
the parties’ consent to the filing of amicus briefs are on file with
the clerk.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Distinct from their roles as sovereigns, state,
local, and federal governments act as managers of
large public workforces that carry out vital public
functions. Governments have adopted a range of
strategies for meeting the inevitable management
challenges that arise, and this Court has “often
recognized that government has significantly greater
leeway in its dealings with citizen employees than it
does when it brings its sovereign power to bear on
citizens at large.” Engquist v. Or. Dep’t. of Agric., 553
U.S. 591, 599 (2008).
Like many other public sector employers,
Illinois has reasonably decided to manage its
workforce of public assistants in part by allowing
workers to select, on a majority basis, a union as
their collective bargaining representative.
The
selected union is then required to fairly represent all
members of the bargaining unit as their exclusive
representative. In turn, members pay a service fee
that covers their share of costs that are germane to
the union’s representation.
These interlocking
features—selection of a bargaining representative by
a majority, exclusive representation, the duty of fair
representation, and the service fee—are important
aspects of a time-tested model of public sector
workforce management that has been repeatedly
upheld by this Court. Here, however, Petitioners
challenge both exclusive representation and the
service fee (also called an “agency fee” or “fair-share
fee”) on First Amendment grounds.
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I.
Unlike in the private sector, state
employers choose for themselves whether to permit
their employees to bargain collectively, and can also
set—within established First Amendment limits—
countless other parameters, such as the subjects
over which bargaining will occur and the
permissibility of strikes. In other words, each state
may structure its labor law in the manner that it
concludes
best
promotes
sound
workforce
management. While some states accordingly reject
bargaining with their workforces altogether, others
reasonably
conclude—and
indeed,
research
suggests—that collective bargaining can be an
effective way to aggregate, clarify, and channel
workers’ preferences, and that collective bargaining
can promote the state’s own efficiency interests by
promoting workforce engagement and longevity.
States that permit collective bargaining
almost
universally
adopt
the
exclusive
representation model. Under that model, once a
union has been democratically selected by a
bargaining unit, the state bargains with only that
representative. Further, that union represents all
the workers within the unit, including those who do
not join the union. The alternative—in which a
union represents only those workers within a
bargaining unit who choose representation—would
allow a potential multitude of unions to demand
separate negotiations and separate contracts with an
employer. States that adopt collective bargaining
almost always reject this system, which threatens to
raise bargaining costs and increase intra-workforce
conflict.
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Likewise, states may reasonably conclude
that, within a system of exclusive representation,
employees should be required to pay their share of
the costs of representation. In particular, states may
reasonably conclude that allowing bargaining unit
members to choose not to pay their share towards
the costs of representation would lead to free riding
that would undermine the benefits sought from the
exclusive representation system.
Illinois’s particular interests in allowing its
Medicaid-funded personal assistants to select a
union to represent them in bargaining with the state
are evident. A union can serve an important quasihuman-resources
role
in
aggregating
and
communicating
information
about
this
geographically
dispersed
workforce.
This
information can aid the state in determining how
best to attract and retain a qualified and
professional workforce, potentially improving service
delivery and decreasing program costs.
Further,
unions can help improve workforce health and safety
through cooperative partnerships with public
managers, as in this case, where the union has
negotiated training and equipment programs.
II.
Both exclusive representation and the
required agency fee are consistent with the First
Amendment. This case is squarely controlled by
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977)
and a line of related cases, which there is no reason
to revisit.
However, even if Abood were
distinguishable, well-established First Amendment
principles demonstrate that Illinois was free to
implement its chosen collective bargaining system.
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This conclusion does not turn on whether the public
assistants are state “employees.”
First, public administrators are free to consult
selected stakeholders—including elected employee
representatives—through non-public channels, and a
state’s choice to consult some individuals or entities
and not others does not even implicate the First
Amendment rights of those who are excluded. This
larger principle squarely encompasses the exclusive
representation system, in which a state determines
that it will set workplace policy in consultation with
a majority-supported union, and not other unions or
individual employees. The only exception to this
principle—that states may not selectively exclude
individuals from voicing their opinions in public
fora—is not implicated by this case.
Second, public administrators are free to
compel payments to subsidize mandatory economic
associations that serve legitimate non-speech
purposes. This Court has applied this principle not
just in the agency fee context, but also in the
contexts of bar dues and mandatory advertising
programs.
Thus, for the agency fee to be
constitutional, Illinois need only show that it serves
a larger system of economic association with a
legitimate economic purpose. Collective bargaining
through an exclusive representative for the purpose
of promoting stable labor relations and the effective
administration of the personal assistant program
easily qualifies under this standard.
Accordingly, Illinois is free to conclude that its
interest and those of its citizens in a stable and
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professional workforce of public assistants is best
served by permitting personal assistants to choose
an exclusive bargaining representative, and to
require represented personal assistants to pay an
agency fee.
ARGUMENT
I. The State Has A Well-Established Interest In
Managing Its Workforce By Allowing
Personal Assistants to Bargain Collectively
A. The Court
Discretion
Workforces

Allows States Significant
In
Managing
Their

Over 20 million people work for local, state,
and federal government.
See Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Table A-8. Employed persons by class of
worker
and
part-time
status,
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.t08.htm (last
visited Dec. 29, 2013). This multifaceted workforce
keeps homes and families safe and healthy, educates
children and adults, and provides the public
infrastructure upon which we depend. See Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469
U.S. 528, 575 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(describing “fire prevention, police protection,
sanitation, and public health” as “activities that
epitomize the concerns of local, democratic selfgovernment”).
Government employers and
administrators must maintain stable and productive
relationships with their workforces, especially when
they have diverse and even conflicting needs. States
have experimented with different approaches to
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workforce management. Here, Petitioners challenge
Illinois’s decision to allow certain publicly funded
home-care personal assistants to choose to bargain
collectively through an exclusive representative over
those working conditions that are set by the state.
Infra Part I.C.
Recognizing that states require flexibility to
manage their workforces effectively, this Court has
“often recognized that government has significantly
greater leeway in its dealings with citizen employees
than it does when it brings its sovereign power to
bear on citizens at large.” Engquist, 553 U.S. at 599;
see also Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S.Ct.
2488, 2495 (2011) (“Government must have
authority . . . to restrain employees who use petitions
to frustrate progress towards the ends they have
been hired to achieve.”); Waters v. Churchill, 511
U.S. 661, 671 (1994) (plurality opinion) (“the
government as employer indeed has far broader
powers than does the government as sovereign”);
United Pub. Workers of Am. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75,
101 (1947) (“For regulation of employees it is not
necessary that the act regulated be anything more
than an act reasonably deemed by Congress to
interfere with the efficiency of the public service.”).
Accordingly, this Court has permitted public sector
managers much of the same discretion enjoyed by
the private sector. See NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct.
746, 759-60 (2011) (“Like any employer, the
Government is entitled to have its projects staffed by
reliable, law-abiding persons who will ‘efficiently and
effectively’ discharge their duties.”) (citation
omitted); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418
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(2006) (“[g]overnment employers, like private
employers, need a significant degree of control over
their employees’ words and actions”); Connick v.
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983) (“[G]overnment
offices could not function if every employment
decision became a constitutional matter.”); United
States Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter
Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 564 (1973) (holding Congress
may bar public employees from engaging in certain
political activity).
Many public sector employers, like their
private sector counterparts, 2 have adopted
management policies and practices designed to
promote worker voice—that is, to enhance employeremployee cooperation and to productively channel
and amplify workers’ participation within an
organization. Petitioners seek to eliminate one such
policy that is available to public employers and
administrators—namely, collective bargaining with
an exclusive representative chosen by the workers
themselves, and supported by a mandatory fairshare fee. See Pet. Brief at 18-24. If successful, this
dramatic change in state labor policy would both
eliminate a time-tested model of workplace
The alignment of employee and employer incentives through
workplace participation has been a significant theme in
popular and academic management theory. See, e.g., Eileen
Applebaum et al., Manufacturing Advantage: Why HighPerformance Work Systems Pay Off (2000); Joseph M. Juran,
Quality by Design (1992); David I. Levine, Reinventing the
Workplace: How Business and Employees Can Both Win (1995);
Saul A. Rubenstein & Thomas A. Kochan: Learning from
Saturn: Possibilities for Corporate Governance and Employee
Relations (2001).

2
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management and depart from fundamental legal
principles.
B. The State Has Well-Established Interests
In A Collective Bargaining System That
Includes Exclusive Representation And
Agency Fee Contributions
1. Collective
Bargaining
Is
A
Traditional System Of Personnel
Management
With
Potential
Benefits
For
Public
Sector
Employers
Collective bargaining has been part of the
public employment landscape for more than five
decades. Wisconsin Employment Relations Act, Wis.
Stat. Ann. Ch. 509 (West 1959). Since then, it has
become a familiar process that most state
governments and the federal government have
adopted in some form. Joseph Slater, The Rise &
Fall of SB-5: The Rejection of an Anti-Union Law in
Historical & Political Context, 43 U. Tol. L. Rev. 473,
477-79 (2012).
There is tremendous variation in states’
approaches to collective bargaining, making the
metaphor of states as laboratories particularly apt.
Unlike in the private sector, where federal labor law
uniformly regulates employers within many sectors
of the economy, see 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (National
Labor Relations Act); 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.
(Railway Labor Act), states choose whether to
bargain collectively with their employees. Moreover,
a state that legislates in favor of collective
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bargaining by public employees may then set
additional parameters, including the subjects over
which unions may bargain, the legality of employee
strikes, and the availability of various dispute
resolution mechanisms.
The extent of states’
discretion in this area is illustrated by the varied
approaches that they have taken:
[State public sector labor] laws both
vary considerably and are more subject
to political shifts at a local level. A
minority of states does not permit any
public employees to bargain, and
another minority only permits a few
types of public employees to bargain. . .
. Also, where collective bargaining is
authorized, the scope of bargaining is
generally narrower—sometimes quite a
bit narrower—than in the private
sector. Further, the majority of states
do not allow any public employees to
strike.
Joseph Slater, The Strangely Unsettled State of
Public-Sector Labor in the Past Thirty Years, 30
Hofstra Lab. & Emp. L.J. 511, 512-13 (2013)
(hereinafter Slater, Unsettled State). Accordingly,
states can structure their labor laws to amplify those
aspects of collective bargaining that they view as
most helpful, and correspondingly to downplay or
eliminate other aspects (such as the strike) that they
view as counterproductive.
However, there are also First Amendment
limits to states’ freedom to innovate in this area,
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which protect individuals’ rights not to associate
with a union.
States may not require their
employees to become union members or pay the costs
of union ideological or political endeavors; at most,
they may require represented employees to pay for
the costs associated with collective bargaining and
other activities that are germane to the
representation. Chi. Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475
U.S. 292, 301-02 (1986). Further, bargaining unit
members are entitled to notice and other protections
of these rights, id. at 308-09.
There are good reasons that some states adopt
a system of public sector bargaining. One reason is
to enhance employer-employee communication. The
benefits of providing workers with a collective voice
are evident in the reasons that workers themselves
give for wanting better communication with
managers: not just to improve the quality of their
own lives, but also to make their employers more
successful. Richard B. Freeman and Joel Rogers,
What Workers Want 4-5 (1999).
Unions are a traditional avenue for
amplifying, clarifying, and channeling worker voice,
allowing management to better account for worker
views and priorities. This role in aggregating and
funneling employees’ perspectives not only helps
those employees to feel more useful and engaged, but
it also has been linked to certain productivity gains,
including lower turnover, search, and retraining
costs. See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt and Arthur R.
Traynor,
Regulating Unions and Collective
Bargaining, in Labor and Employment Law and
Economics 96, 109 (Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt et al.
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eds., 2009). Empirical studies have found that
where mature collective bargaining relationships
develop, “unions can increase firm productivity in
certain industries, particularly if management
constructively embraces, rather than fights, union
contributions.” Id. at 109-10; see also Richard B.
Freeman & James L. Medoff, What Do Unions Do?
19 (1985) (arguing that their empirical analysis
showed that “unions are associated with greater
efficiency in most settings”). The potential benefits
of this arrangement are obvious, in that it helps
public employers to improve morale and satisfaction
as efficiently as possible. Samuel Estreicher, “Easy
In, Easy Out”: A Future for U.S. Workplace
Representation, 6 (Nov. 30, 2013 draft), at:
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/labor-law---easy-in-easy-out----december-12-2013.pdf
(“[c]ollective bargaining provides a means for
workers to collectively express their preference for [a
particular workplace policy] and for parties to
determine whether the collective benefits outweigh
the collective costs of its provision”). Not only would
it be logistically difficult for a public administrator to
replicate the union’s function in this regard
(particularly when the relevant workforce is
dispersed), but a unilaterally determined outcome
could lack legitimacy in the eyes of the workforce.
In sum, governments may reasonably decide
to allow their workers to bargain collectively for a
host of reasons, including their judgment that
unions can streamline workforce management.
Although Petitioners do not directly attack collective
bargaining itself, they seek to prevent governments
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from structuring public sector bargaining to require
or allow either exclusive representation or the
agency shop. The next two subsections explain why
public employers often conclude that these features
are crucial to an effective system of public-sector
bargaining.
2. Exclusive Representation Is A Fair
And Efficient Structure For Public
Sector Collective Bargaining
The American system of collective bargaining
is built upon the premise of exclusive representation
as chosen by a majority of workers. See Emporium
Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community
Organization, 420 U.S. 50, 62 (1975) (“Central to the
policy of fostering collective bargaining, where the
employees elect that course, is the principle of
majority rule.”); Clyde W. Summers, Exclusive
Representation: A Comparative Inquiry Into A
“Unique” American Principle, 20 Comp. Lab. L. &
Pol’y J. 47, 47 (1998) (“[t]he fundamental ordering
principle which shapes American labor law and
collective bargaining is the principle of exclusive
representation”).
Petitioners challenge Illinois’s
decision to implement the exclusive representation
system for home health care personal assistants.
Pet. Br. at 35. They suggest that, to the extent
Illinois wishes to allow personal assistants to choose
union representation, that representation should
take place on a members-only basis. However,
members-only representation presents significant
complications,
potentially
undermining
or
eliminating the advantages of collective bargaining
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that lead states to permit bargaining in the first
place.
In a “members-only” or “minority-union”
regime, unions negotiate only on behalf of those who
want representation. Non-members are not bound to
union representation; conversely, the union owes
non-members no duty. Cf. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.
Co., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944). From an employer’s
perspective, however, exclusive representation is a
significantly more straightforward system. There
are only two tracks for each unit of employees: no
representation or complete representation by one
bargaining agent. Either the state will determine
working conditions unilaterally, or it will meet with
a single union, which is in turn obligated to fairly
represent all bargaining unit members during the
negotiation. The importance of this aspect of the
exclusive representation system should not be
understated; indeed, some states structure their
public sector labor law with an eye towards
minimizing the number of different contracts that
must be negotiated and administered even among
different bargaining units. E.g., Wash. Rev. Code
§ 41.80.020(3) (2013) (requiring public sector unions
representing separate bargaining units to bargain in
coalition over health care benefits, with the resulting
agreement to be common to all CBAs).
In contrast, members-only bargaining would
allow a potential multitude of unions within a single
bargaining unit to each demand a right to separately
negotiate with the employer over employment terms
and conditions for their own members, resulting in
different contracts for similarly situated employees.
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Such a system would multiply the employer’s
negotiation costs and greatly complicate the
ramifications of such bargaining. It would tend to
generate instability and discourage compromise, as
each union could compete with others on a
continuing basis to demonstrate its ability to gain
“more” for its members (and attack any others for
accepting “less”). Multiple-union units also have a
much greater potential for discord between unions,
leading to a greater chance of strikes or other
disruption. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local
Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 52 (1983) (observing
that the “exclusion of the rival union may reasonably
be considered a means of insuring labor-peace” by
preventing the employer from “becoming a
battlefield for inter-union squabbles”); Abood, 431
U.S. at 224 (discussing the “confusion and conflict
that could arise if rival . . . unions, holding quite
different views as to [terms and conditions of
employment], each sought to obtain the employer’s
agreement”). Such workplace disruption poses
special concerns for public employers and
administrators:
Disputes during labor negotiations are
especially costly in the public sector. In
the private sector, competitors can
provide goods or services that are not
supplied by the striking workers. In the
public sector, however, the government
is often the sole supplier of a service. In
many cases this service is essential, and
disruption of its supply could be life
threatening.
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Janet Currie & Sheena McConnell, The Impact of
Collective-Bargaining Legislation on Disputes in the
U.S. Public Sector: No Legislation May Be the Worst
Legislation, 37 J.L. & Econ. 519, 519 (1994).3
Further, exclusive representation removes
employees’ incentives to undercut or derogate their
colleagues who are on the “outside,” as could occur in
a system of members-only bargaining.
In a
members-only system, union-represented employees
could try to cut a sweeter deal for themselves at the
expense of the nonmembers, or employers could
reward nonmembers exorbitantly in order to
dissuade union membership. In either situation,
however, the members-only system results in conflict
and disequilibrium.
States that have opted for a system of
collective bargaining almost universally require
exclusive representation of employee bargaining
units.
Their interests in stable representation
equilibria, ongoing constructive dialogue, and
reduced probabilities for strikes and other conflict all
justify this decision.

States have responded to this concern in part by prohibiting
public-sector strikes in many circumstances. Slater, Unsettled
State, 513 (noting that “the majority of states do not allow any
public employees to strike”).
However, states may also
reasonably conclude that exclusive bargaining is more likely to
reduce the risk of damaging public-sector shutdowns. Cf.
Currie & McConnell, 520 (“Strike costs, as measured by the
incidence and length of strikes, are greatest in the absence of
legislation requiring employers to bargain.”).

3
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3. The Fair Share Fee Is An Important
Component Of An Effective System
Of Exclusive Representation
Petitioners contend that even if exclusive
representation is constitutionally permissible,
represented
public
sector
workers
should
nonetheless be permitted to opt out of paying their
share of the costs incurred by their elected
representatives. Pet. Brief at 34-36. But just as
exclusive representation supports employer interests
including “labor peace,” Abood, 431 U.S. at 224, the
agency shop is critical to solving the free-rider
problem that could otherwise unravel or seriously
weaken collective representation arrangements.
Agency fee agreements require represented
employees to pay their “fair share” of the costs of
union representation.4 The reason for the agency
shop is straightforward as a matter of economics.
Under a system of exclusive representation, the
elected union has a duty to represent all employees
within the bargaining unit, and the benefits of
collective bargaining flow to all as well. Steele, 323
U.S. at 202 (“It is a principle of general application
that the exercise of a granted power to act in behalf
of others involves the assumption toward them of a
duty to exercise the power in their interest and
behalf, and that such a grant of power will not be
Petitioners make no allegation that their funds are going to
anything other than the costs of negotiating and administering
a collective bargaining agreement. Harris v. Quinn, 656 F.3d
692, 696 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting that Petitioners “do not allege
that the actual fees collected are too high or that the fees are
being used for purposes other than collective bargaining”).

4
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deemed to dispense with all duty toward those for
whom it is exercised unless so expressed.”). The
economic consequences of eliminating the agency
fee—the free rider problem—are easy to model. See
Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public
Goods and the Theory of Groups 88 (1971 ed.) (“A
rational worker will not voluntarily contribute to a
(large) union providing a collective benefit since he
alone would not perceptibly strengthen the union,
and since he would get the benefits of any union
achievements whether or not he supported the
union.”); Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of
Law 430 (8th ed., 2011) (“The representation
election, the principle of exclusive representation,
and the union shop together constitute an ingenious
set of devices . . . for overcoming the free-rider
problems that would otherwise plague the union . . .
.”). The empirical evidence supports the model’s
predictions. See Matthew Dimick, Labor Law, New
Governance, and the Ghent System, 90 N.C. L. Rev.
319, 354 & n.187 (2012) (“[s]everal studies show that
the level of free riding is higher in right-to-work
states”) (citing studies).
This court has previously acknowledged this
economic reality. See Abood, 431 U.S. at 221-22 (the
“union-shop arrangement has been thought to
distribute fairly the cost of these activities among
those who benefit, and it counteracts the incentive
that employees might otherwise have to become freeriders”) (internal quotation marks, citations, and
footnote omitted)).
Likewise, Justice Scalia
explained in Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500
U.S. 507 (1991) that:
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Where the state imposes upon the
union a duty to deliver services, it may
permit
the
union
to
demand
reimbursement for them; or, looked at
from the other end, where the state
creates in the nonmembers a legal
entitlement from the union, it may
compel them to pay the cost. The
“compelling state interest” that justifies
this constitutional rule . . . is that in
some respects they are free riders
whom the law requires the union to
carry—indeed, requires the union to go
out of its way to benefit, even at the
expense of its other interests.
Id. at 556 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
Petitioners’ arguments against agency fees
demonstrate the interconnectedness of such fees
with the American system of collective bargaining
and exclusive representation.
They argue that
agency fees cannot be justified by the exclusive
representation responsibility because unions choose
such responsibility. Pet. Brief at 35. But this
ignores that Illinois law requires unions to
undertake this responsibility if they wish to
represent any employees at all, infra Part I.C. And
as discussed earlier, states have good reason for
mandating exclusive representation as part of their
collective bargaining systems, supra Part I.B.2.
Eliminating agency fees would disrupt the
intricate
collective
bargaining
machinery
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constructed by Illinois and other states to serve their
employment needs. Exclusive representation and
the agency shop are closely linked, and a state that
chooses the former has strong economic reasons to
adopt the latter as well. As a matter of policy,
economics, and constitutional law, states should be
free to provide for collective-bargaining relationships
like the one at issue here.
C. Illinois
Has
Reasonably
Chosen
Collective
Bargaining
By
Personal
Assistants As Its System Of Personnel
Management for Its Home-Care Program
Petitioners argue that, even if states generally
have interests sufficient to support their systems of
collective bargaining, Illinois has no such interest
here. Pet. Br. at 24-31, 39-46. However, Illinois has
perhaps a greater interest in establishing a system
of collective representation in the home health care
arena, given the challenges it faces in managing
service provision in this context. Whereas the
previous two subsections have shown why states
generally may choose to allow their workforces to
bargain collectively, this subsection focuses on the
role
of
collective
bargaining
in
Illinois’s
administration of the home-care personal assistant
program.
Like many other states, Illinois allows its
workforce to select bargaining representatives. See
Public Labor Relations Act (PLRA), 5 Ill. Comp. Stat.
315/1 et seq. Under the PLRA, a union chosen on a
majority basis by the members of a bargaining unit
becomes that unit’s exclusive representative for
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purposes of contract negotiations about employment
terms, and must represent all bargaining unit
members fairly. 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. 315/3(f), 315/9(a5), 315/6(d). Further, Illinois law permits the state
to agree to an agency shop. 5 Ill. Comp. Stat.
315/6(e).
Illinois’s Medicaid-funded Home Services
Program (Rehabilitation Program) provides care to
disabled individuals in their homes. See 20 Ill.
Comp. Stat. 2405/1 et seq.; 89 Ill. Admin. Code
676.10 et seq. The advantages of home care include
lower costs for housing, greater comfort for
customers, and easier access for family and loved
ones. See 89 Ill. Admin. Code 676.10(a). However,
managing the provision of care across thousands of
homes requires innovative and flexible approaches in
order to balance customers’ privacy and control with
the interests of the state in ensuring proper care for
its entire eligible population. Illinois has chosen to
permit its over 20,000 personal assistants who serve
customers through this program to choose whether
to bargain collectively. 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. 315/3(n)(o); Public Act 93-204 (Dist. Ct. Doc. 32-10).5
The State has a set of diverse interests in
managing the long-term and ongoing relationships
between itself, customers, and personal assistants.
Further, it has reasonably concluded these interests
are best served by offering the personal assistants
an opportunity to bargain collectively. Three of
The Disabled Persons Rehabilitation Act was similarly
amended. 20 Ill. Comp. Stat. 2405/3(f); Public Act 93-204 (Dist.
Ct. Doc. 32-10).
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these interests—managing employee productivity,
protecting customer health and safety, and
protecting personal assistants’ health and safety—
are discussed further below.
1.
As the entity responsible for paying
personal assistants to provide home care services
within a state program, Illinois has an employer’s
interest in managing workforce productivity to
ensure services are readily available, effective, and
efficient.
A union’s role in aggregating employee voice,
supra Part I.B.1, is especially important in the home
care context. Unions can collect information about
the issues faced by geographically dispersed personal
assistants, including employment problems they are
encountering and suggestions they have for
improvements, and communicate that information to
the state in an organized fashion. Essentially, the
union can serve as a quasi-human-resources
department for a set of workers whose dispersion
would otherwise present a serious management
challenge. Further, qualitative studies of the health
care industry have demonstrated that unions help
build teams, foster the growth of human capital, and
improve patient outcomes. Thomas Kochan, Will the
Supreme Court Support or Block Development of a
Modern Collective Bargaining System for Homecare
Workers?,
at
8,
Dec.
10,
2013,
at:
http://www.employmentpolicy.org/sites/www.employ
mentpolicy.org/files/field-contentfile/pdf/Michael%20Lillich/Kochan%20Commentary
%20on%20Harris%20v%20Quinn%20Case%2012%20
10%2013%2013.pdf (hereinafter Kochan, Homecare)
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(“The Kaiser Permanente study . . . documents the
significant investments in resources, time, and
personnel required of unions to develop the capacity
and mobilize and serve the workforce in partnership,
team, and network building activities.”).
2. Moreover, the State has an interest in
protecting customer health and safety by ensuring a
stable and well-qualified workforce available to all
qualified customers who could benefit from the
program. The State pursues this interest—balanced
against its interest in ensuring that customers are
empowered to decide among individual workers—in
part through its hiring qualifications and review
process for personal assistants. 89 Ill. Admin. Code
686.10. However, the interest is a continuing one
that goes beyond any individual customer’s choice of
a particular personal assistant. In particular, the
state has an interest in attracting qualified workers
into the program and lowering the turnover rate
among personal assistants, because longevity
contributes to a competent and professional
workforce. This interest is particularly acute in the
home health care field, which is plagued with high
turnover based in part on low wages and worker
dispersion and isolation. See Kochan, Homecare, 2.
Unions can serve the State’s interests in
customer health and safety by helping to lower
employee turnover, cut search and retraining costs,
and boost productivity in the context of a cooperative
partnership with an employer. See supra Part I.B.1;
see also Kochan, Homecare, 9 (recent research
“demonstrates that productivity, quality, customer
satisfaction, and employee satisfaction are enhanced
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when union and management leaders work together
and apply state-of-the-art concepts and tools to
foster a cooperative, low conflict, high employee
involvement, transformed workplace” (emphasis in
original)). Perhaps most obviously, union-negotiated
benefits can reduce personal assistants’ incentives to
leave the field. For example, the current collective
bargaining agreement in this case established
significantly improved (yet still modest) wages, CBA,
Art. VII, Sec. 1, a health benefits fund, Art. VII, Sec.
2; a Personal Assistants Training Program
administered jointly by the State and the union, Art
IX, Sec. 1 & CBA at 18-22 (Side Letter); an
orientation program, Article IX; a grievance
procedure with binding arbitration for wage, hour,
and other contractual disputes, Article XI; and a nostrike clause that prohibits work stoppages, Art. XII,
Sec. 5.6 These improvements stabilize the workforce
and lead to better care for customers.
3. Further, the State has a particular interest
in its own workforce’s health and safety. While this
is true of all public employees, entering another
person’s home to provide personal, intimate care can
entail unique safety concerns. See Gurumurthy
Ramachandran et al., Handling Worker and Third
Party Exposures to Nanotherapeutics During Clinical
Trials, 40 J.L. Med. & Ethics 856, 862 (2012) (“While
the employer of the workers may be responsible for
the health and safety of the workers, they may not
The current CBA is available on the Illinois Department of
Central
Management
Services
website
at:
http://www2.illinois.gov/cms/Employees/Personnel/Documents/e
mp_seiupast.pdf.
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have complete control over exposures in the home.”).
Unions and employers have developed a variety of
programs for protecting health and safety. Some are
as straightforward as encouraging employees to
report health and safety problems so they can be
addressed quickly (and creating a mechanism for
them to do so), or calling for the provision of gloves
to address an existing health and safety concern,
CBA, Art. IX, Sec. 2. Others are more complex, such
as the creation of a joint committee to study health
and safety issues, Art. IX, Sec. 1; or the provision of
employee home health care training—something
that is underprovided in the home health care field,
and that may require creative approaches to
effectuate. See Ramachandran, 40 J.L. Med. &
Ethics at 862. (“[t]he training of home care workers
is variable and often inadequate.”).
All but one of the Petitioners in this case
provide home care as an assistant to a family
member. J.A. 17-18. The State’s interest in the
provision of care by these assistants is not
diminished by Petitioners’ familial relations. In fact,
for many personal assistants who are related to their
customers, their relative isolation and inexperience
in this labor force make the union’s experience and
the union-negotiated training opportunities even
more important. However, the state has an even
greater interest in ensuring quality services for the
many customers who cannot (or who prefer not to)
rely on family members for personal assistant
services.
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II. Public Employers And Administrators May
Agree To Exclusive Representation And The
Agency Shop In Order To Effectively And
Efficiently Deliver Home Health Care
The previous section discussed why states like
Illinois have reasonably decided to allow personal
assistants the opportunity to elect a union to
represent them in bargaining. Permitting union
representation—including exclusive representation
and the agency shop—helps achieve government
interests including stabilized labor relations and the
development of a qualified, professional workforce.
This section shows why this policy choice does not
violate the First Amendment, and why exclusive
representation and the agency shop are instead
consistent with a long line of settled case law from a
variety of contexts.
As an initial matter, amici maintain that this
case is squarely controlled by Abood v. Detroit Bd. of
Ed., 431 U.S. 209 (1977), and that there is no reason
to revisit Abood or any of the other cases upholding
the constitutionality of the agency shop. 7
Petitioners imply that Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S.
209 (1977) is the only case that this Court would need to
overturn should petitioners prevail in their position that public
sector exclusive representation and the agency shop
arrangements are unconstitutional. Pet. Br. at 16-36. As this
Part demonstrates, that is incorrect; in fact, petitioners’
position is inconsistent with a series of cases concerning the
constitutionality of cooperative economic programs involving
compelled payments, such as bar associations and agricultural
advertising schemes, infra Part II.B, as well as with First
Amendment cases concerning governmental policymaking,

7
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Nonetheless, this section shows that even if this
Court were to conclude that Abood is not on all fours
with the facts of this case, there is no First
Amendment barrier to Illinois’s chosen collective
bargaining system.
This Court generally defers to government
managerial
decision-making,
protecting
government’s ability to act freely in its role as
“manager of its ‘internal operation,’” as distinct from
its role as sovereign. Nelson, 131 S.Ct. at 757
(quoting Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v.
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 896 (1961)); see also
Engquist, 553 U.S. at 598. Accordingly, this Court
including (though not limited to) cases arising in the public
employment context, cited in this Part.
Further, Petitioners mischaracterize Abood as an anomaly in
which the Court imported the “labor peace” rationale from the
Commerce Clause context, Pet. Br. at 19-21. To the contrary,
Abood rested on a series of previous First Amendment cases
arising in the context of the Railway Labor Act, and it has been
repeatedly reaffirmed in the public sector context.
E.g.,
Railway Employees Dep’t v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 238 (1956)
(union shop agreement under Railway Labor Act did not violate
First Amendment); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S.
740, 746-48 & 768-69 (1961) (characterizing Hanson as First
Amendment decision and construing Railway Labor Act to
avoid constitutional problems); Hudson, 475 U.S. at 301;
Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 555-56 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (construing the
“constitutional rule suggested in Hanson and later confirmed in
Abood” and describing “compelling state interest” that supports
constitutionality of agency shop); Locke v. Karass, 555 U.S. 207,
213-14 (2009) (characterizing constitutionality of agency shop
in public sector as “general First Amendment principle”).
These cases would also be vulnerable in the event that this
Court overruled Abood.
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has often held that the First Amendment rights of
individuals who perform work for the government
can be overcome by government proprietors’ exercise
of their managerial prerogatives to effectively and
efficiently provide services. E.g., Guarnieri, 131
S.Ct. at 2494 (government’s “substantial interest in
ensuring that all of its operations are efficient and
effective” justify “[r]estraints” on workforce);
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418 (“When a citizen enters
government service, the citizen by necessity must
accept certain limitations on his or her freedom”).
Further, the government’s status a “proprietor” or
“manager” of internal operations is not limited to
situations in which it is also a common-law
“employer.” Nelson, 131 S.Ct. at 758-59 (rejecting
argument that diminished First Amendment
protections applicable to public employees did not
apply to independent contractors); see also O’Hare
Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712,
721-22 (1996) (First Amendment protections do not
turn on common-law distinction between contractor
and public employee); Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v.
Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 678-80 (1996) (same).
Accordingly, these principles control even if this
Court concludes that Illinois is not the technical
employer of the personal assistants.
For the reasons that follow, Illinois’s decision
to permit personal assistants to choose an exclusive
representative was a valid exercise of the state’s
managerial prerogative.
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A. Exclusive Representation Is Consistent
With The First Amendment Because
Governments May Decide With Whom To
Consult
Before
Setting
Working
Conditions
Petitioners argue that Illinois’s adoption of
the exclusive representation system violates the
First Amendment because “homecare providers are
not managed or supervised by the State.” Pet. Br. at
39. Putting aside the factual accuracy of that
statement,8 it is irrelevant to the First Amendment
analysis. Petitioners’ argument regarding exclusive
representation assumes that governments may not
consult some stakeholders through a non-public
channel that is not available to all stakeholders. But
government entities are generally free to privately
consult anyone, including a union designated by a
majority of the workforce, in making its decisions;
conversely, governments are generally free to ignore
anyone, including individual workers. The exception
to this general principle—that government may not
exclude individuals, including union-represented
public employees, from being heard in public fora—is
not applicable here.
This Court’s decision in Minn. State Bd. for
Cmty. Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271 (1984) is
largely dispositive of this issue. Knight concerned
the constitutionality of Minnesota’s exclusive
As Respondents Quinn and SEIU HII describe, Illinois has
considerable oversight over the personal assistants as their
joint employer. Quinn Br. at 48-50; SEIU HII Br. at 1-3 & 4647.

8
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representation rule under which the state would
either bargain or “meet and confer” over terms and
conditions of employment only with elected exclusive
representatives of professional employees. Id. at
274-75.
A group of community college faculty
brought a First Amendment challenge, claiming, in
this Court’s words, “an entitlement to a government
audience for their views.” Id. at 282. Rejecting that
claim, the Court reasoned that “Minnesota has
simply restricted the class of persons to whom it will
listen in its making of policy,” which it was free to do
because “[t]he Constitution does not grant to
members of the public generally a right to be heard
by public bodies making decisions of policy.” Id. at
282, 283.
In other words, Petitioners’ First Amendment
rights are not even implicated by Illinois’s decision
to adopt the exclusive representation system for
negotiations over certain employment terms,
because states are generally free to set workplace
policy in a non-public process in consultation with
some constituent groups—here, an organization
selected by the affected workforce itself—and not
others. Moreover, this principle does not depend on
whether the state is acting as an employer. Id. at
286 (“[a]ppellees thus have no constitutional right as
members of the public to a government audience for
their policy views”) (emphasis added); see also Smith
v. Ark. State Highway Employees, 441 U.S. 463, 465
(1979) (“the First Amendment does not impose any
affirmative obligation on the government to listen, to
respond, or . . . to recognize the association and
bargain with it”).
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Conversely, Petitioners remain free to
advance any position, including positions that are
adverse to the state or the union, either individually
or in concert, through any channels that are open to
the public. City of Madison v. Wis. Employment
Relations Comm’n, 429 U.S. 167, 175 (1976) (unionrepresented employees have First Amendment right
to speak “[w]here the State has opened a forum for
direct citizen involvement”); Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 521
(employees are “free to petition their neighbors and
government in opposition to the union which
represents them”). However, this principle bears no
relevance to this case, because Petitioners do not
allege that Illinois has opened the bargaining
process to the public, yet excluded Petitioners. Cf.
City of Madison, 429 U.S. at 178-79 (“the First
Amendment plays a crucially different role when . . .
a government body has . . . determined to open its
decisionmaking processes to public view and
participation”) (Brennan, J., concurring). Nor does
bargaining with an exclusive representative itself
create a public forum. Perry Education Ass’n, 460
U.S. at 48-49 (opening school mail system to union
with exclusive representative status did not trigger
obligation to allow rival union mail system access).
Accordingly, this Court’s settled precedent is
entirely consistent with Illinois’s decision to adopt
the exclusive representation system.
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B. The Agency Shop Is Constitutional
Because It Is Germane To A Larger
Program Of Economic Association With
Legitimate Economic Ends
Governments may compel payments to
subsidize mandatory economic associations that in
turn serve legitimate economic ends. Glickman v.
Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 469
(1997) (mandatory payment permissible “as a part of
a
broader
collective
enterprise
in
which
[participants’] freedom to act independently is
already constrained by the regulatory scheme”); see
also United States v. United Foods, 533 U.S. 405, 413
(2001) (compelled payments to private organization
permissible as part of required economic cooperation
where there is “some state imposed obligation which
makes group membership less than voluntary”).
This principle underlies not just Abood and other
cases concerning the agency shop, supra n.6, but also
cases concerning mandatory bar dues and generic
agricultural advertising schemes.
These cases
reveal that governments may solve collective
economic problems through mandatory associations,
including by requiring participants to make
payments to support these associations. 9 Thus,
Illinois need only show that it adopted the agency
shop within its workforce of personal assistants as
part of a larger regulatory system of economic
cooperation with a predominantly non-speechThis principle should apply a fortiori in the context of the
public sector workforce, itself a form of economic association in
which states’ heightened managerial interests can often
overcome workers’ First Amendment interests. Supra Part II.

9
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related purpose. Here, that system is collective
bargaining through an exclusive representative, and
its purpose is the promotion of stable labor relations
in order to achieve the goals described in Part I.C.
This
Court
has
generally
permitted
governments to address collective economic problems
by requiring a regulated community to associate.
See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 634 (1984)
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (describing “minimal constitutional
protection
of
the
freedom
of
commercial
association”). Further, members of the regulated
community may be required to financially contribute
to the association’s work that is germane to the
legitimate economic purpose. Accordingly, Abood
began by identifying the larger collective enterprise
of which the agency fee was a part: allowing
bargaining units of public sector workers to select an
exclusive representative, to achieve labor peace. 431
U.S. at 224.
The Court relied on Michigan’s
judgment that the agency shop was an important
component of effective union representation of public
sector workers, for many of the reasons discussed in
Part I.B, before ultimately holding that bargaining
unit members could be required to fund only those
expenses that are “germane to [a union’s] duties as
collective-bargaining representative.” Id. at 223,
232, & 235. This case falls squarely within that
holding.
The Court has applied this approach in other
cases concerning compelled subsidization of
mandatory associations. For example, in Keller v.
State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990), the Court
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applied Abood in permitting mandatory bar dues to
the extent they are germane to “the State’s interest
in regulating the legal profession and improving the
quality of legal services.” Id. at 13. Like in Abood,
the Court did not apply strict scrutiny, which would
have demanded that California show that there were
no alternatives—either to its regulation of lawyers
through a non-governmental bar association, or to
the bar association’s decision to levy mandatory
(rather than optional) dues—that did not require the
mandatory payment. Compare id. at 12 (concluding
that it was “appropriate” to require attorneys to
contribute to bar associations) with Minneapolis Star
& Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575, 585 (1983) (strict scrutiny requires government
to show interest of compelling importance that
cannot be achieved through alternative method).10
Further, this was so even though the Court
acknowledged that at least some germane bar
association activities were likely to be ideologically
objectionable to some bar members. Keller, 496 U.S.
at 15-16 (bar association activities not germane if
they both had “political or ideological coloration” and
were “not reasonably related to the advancement” of
regulation of the legal profession).
For example, the Court did not require California to show
that it could not have achieved the attorney regulation it
desired by making the bar association an arm of public
government, in which case the objectors would have had no
tenable challenge to mandatory assessments. See Johanns v.
Livestock Marketing Ass’n., 544 U.S. 550, 562 (2005) (“Citizens
may challenge compelled support of private speech, but have no
First Amendment right not to fund government speech”);
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (rejecting First
Amendment challenge to social security tax).

10
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Finally, in Glickman, the Court upheld a
requirement that fruit producers contribute to a
generic advertising program as part of a larger
agricultural marketing program intended to
maintain steady food supplies and prices. 521 U.S.
at 461-62. Again, the Court emphasized that the
government was free to achieve its goal through a
comprehensive cooperative program of which
compelled payments were one part, relying on both
Keller and Abood. Id. at 473; see also United Foods,
533 U.S. at 412 (emphasizing that Glickman
“proceeded upon the premise that the producers
were bound together and required by the statute to
market their products according to cooperative
rules”). As in those cases, the Court did not require
the government to prove that the required
association and payment was the least restrictive
way to support agricultural prices. Further, once the
government identified the legitimate interest served
by the system of economic cooperation, the Court
upheld the compelled payment by determining that
it was germane to that interest.11 Glickman, 521
U.S. at 473.

The Glickman dissenters argued that the majority applied
Abood too broadly—arguing that the mandatory subsidization
in Glickman was not justified by the underlying cooperative
economic interest—but they did not question the continued
validity of Abood itself. Glickman, 521 U.S. at 485 (Souter, J.,
dissenting). Rather, they characterized Abood as “a specific
instance of the general principle that government retains its
full power to regulate commercial transactions directly, despite
elements of speech and association inherent in such
transactions,” id. at 484-485.

11
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These cases demonstrate this Court’s
approach in cases like this one, in which economic
regulatory policy involves both required economic
association and mandatory payments to support the
association. Under this approach, Illinois need only
identify the legitimate economic purpose of the
required economic association of which the agency
shop is a part, and then show that the agency fee
covers costs that are germane to that purpose.
Moreover, Keller and Glickman illustrate that this
approach does not turn on employment status, as
both involved regulation of non-employees.
United Foods is fully consistent. There, the
Court rejected a generic advertising program that
did not involve a cooperative economic program of
which required payments to a private entity were
only one component; instead, the “only program the
Government contends the compelled contributions
serve is the very advertising scheme in question.”
533 U.S. at 415. Here, however, the payments are
integral to the mandatory economic association,
which is in turn designed to achieve a legitimate
economic goal: a collective bargaining system based
on exclusive representation, in service of labor
stability and the generation of a more professional
workforce of personal assistants. This is none other
than the “labor peace” rationale articulated in
Abood.
Put another way, the state’s chosen method of
achieving labor peace is not limited to compelled
payments that support speech. The agency fee
undergirds the exclusive representation system,
which, as described above, does not implicate First
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Amendment rights. Further, both the agency fee
and the exclusive representation system are
cornerstones of the comprehensive collective
bargaining structure that Illinois has erected.
Collective bargaining is itself a form of economic
association, as this Court’s cases treating both
collective bargaining and labor unions themselves as
economic, rather than expressive, institutions,
illustrate. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 638 (O’Connor,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (“a State may compel association for the
commercial purposes of engaging in collective
bargaining, administering labor contracts, and
adjusting employment-related grievances, but it may
not infringe on associational rights involving
ideological or political associations”); FTC v.
Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411,
428 (1990) (strike by non-employee attorneys not
protected by First Amendment because government
has greater power to regulate “economic” than
“political” activity); Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n v.
Allied Intern., Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 225-26 (1982)
(describing “political objective” as “far removed from
what has traditionally been thought to be the realm
of legitimate union activity”) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted); Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (“[t]he interests of the
contestants in a labor dispute are primarily
economic”). Accordingly, the Abood-Keller-Glickman
line of cases, rather than United Foods, controls this
case.

38

In addition to the foregoing, regulatory
schemes governed by the Court’s economic
association cases must “impose no restraint on”
freedom of expression; must not “compel any person
to engage in any actual or symbolic speech,” and
must not compel covered individuals to “endorse or
to finance any political or ideological views.”
Glickman, 521 U.S. at 469-70. Petitioners argue
that collective bargaining in the public sector is often
inherently political. Pet. Br. at 41-42 & n.12.
Putting aside Abood’s own resolution of this issue,
this Court has rejected the argument that public
sector working conditions are inherently matters of
public concern. Guarnieri, 131 S.Ct. at 2497 (“The
Petition Clause is not an instrument for public
employees
to
circumvent
these
legislative
enactments when pursuing claims based on ordinary
workplace grievances.”); Connick, 461 U.S. at 148
(public employee’s concerns about confidence and
trust in supervisors, office morale, and felt need for a
grievance committee not matters of public concern).
But more significantly, even if these matters do in
some sense involve “public concerns,” this Court’s
decisions make clear that the First Amendment
associational interests of individuals working in
government service, even when relating to public
concerns, must be balanced against governments’
legitimate managerial interests. See, e.g., Nat’l
Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 564-65
(upholding legislative ban on certain political
activity by federal executive employees that serves
government interests in efficient operations);
Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 99 (“If . . . efficiency may be
best obtained by prohibiting active participation by
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classified employees in politics as party officers or
workers, we see no constitutional objection.”). Here,
Petitioners are free to express their views on any
issues they like. They only claim a right to prevent
the state from structuring its internal personnel
relations in the manner it has determined most
efficiently serves its managerial interests.
Accordingly, Illinois is free to conclude that its
interests and those of its citizens—particularly the
customers who are served by personal assistants—
are best served when working conditions are set
during bargaining with an elected exclusive
representative. The state is further free to require
that personal assistants make agency fee payments
in support of that larger program of economic
cooperation, adopted to ensure a stable and
professional workforce of personal assistants.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
Seventh Circuit should be affirmed.
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